trans.INFO: Are physical cargo thefts still the most common type of incident, or is freight increasingly being stolen through apparently legitimate transport processes?
Małgorzata Łazowska: Both risks remain very real. Transport companies still report cut trailer curtains, roof break-ins and damaged seals or locks. At the same time, criminals are increasingly posing as genuine carriers. We are also seeing attempts to redirect shipments, including by people claiming to work at a warehouse.
How widespread is this problem?
Over the past year, I have asked the transport companies I work with whether they had experienced such an incident or knew someone who had. Almost every time, the answer was yes. That suggests the problem is significant. Virtually everyone has either dealt with it directly or seen someone in their professional circle affected.
Do official statistics capture the full extent of the problem?
Not yet. Reporting remains incomplete because carriers may fear losing customers’ trust or damaging their reputation. As a result, published figures still do not reflect the true scale of this type of fraud.
What is currently the weakest point for a carrier or freight forwarder?
From both an operational and practical perspective, the biggest vulnerability is time pressure. I spent many years working for a transport company, so I know how demanding the job can be, especially when volumes rise towards the end of the year. A small oversight during verification can lead to a major loss. That is why every step matters. Careful checks are often the first way to uncover inconsistencies or other warning signs.
What does a typical warning sign look like?
One classic example is a caller saying that a truck is available and can arrive within 30 minutes, while the documents will follow later. That should immediately raise concerns. Pressure to act quickly is one of the clearest warning signs in this area.
What if something suspicious happens after the transport is already under way?
A caller may claim that the warehouse is full and instruct the driver to go to another location, promising quick unloading there. At first, this can sound like a routine operational issue. Everyone is under pressure, so redirecting the truck may seem like the easiest solution. In reality, any change to the agreed delivery location should trigger an additional verification step.
Which is more dangerous: allowing a completely fictitious carrier into the process or having someone take over communication with a legitimate company?
Established freight platforms have safeguards designed to reduce the risk of fictitious carriers joining their networks. In my view, however, it is often easier for criminals to interfere once a shipment is already being handled by a legitimate company. If someone gains access to an existing conversation and knows what is being carried, where it is going and who is responsible, they can try to influence the next steps in the delivery.
When can a company still spot that something is wrong?
Any situation involving intense time pressure should be treated carefully. Phone-only contact is another warning sign. Suspicion should also be raised when someone uses a generic public email domain and claims to have seen the shipment, have a truck available and be ready to load it. These are familiar patterns, but unfortunately they continue to appear frequently.
Is checking documents alone still enough to provide adequate protection?
Thorough document checks remain essential, but paperwork by itself is not sufficient. We receive reports involving invalid transport licences and expired insurance policies. Staff therefore need regular training and must verify that these documents are still valid.
Is generative AI making transport fraud more sophisticated?
I believe it is making these schemes easier to carry out. Popular AI tools can now be used to create many different types of documents. We can already see how accessible image generation has become. If anyone can produce polished graphics, creating a convincing fake document also becomes less difficult. That lowers the barrier to this type of fraud.
So a document that looks professional should not automatically be trusted?
Exactly. The key issue is not just how a document looks, but whether it is valid and matches information that can be confirmed elsewhere. If anything does not add up, the verification process should stop until the discrepancy has been resolved.
Which theft methods could become more common in 2027?
I expect digital forms of cargo theft to gain ground in 2027, including the use of fictitious carriers and attempts to impersonate established transport companies. Physical theft will not disappear, though. Companies need a two-track approach that protects shipments from both direct attacks and digital manipulation.
Does that mean traditional truck security measures are still necessary?
Absolutely. It would be a mistake to assume that every threat has moved online. Trailers can still be cut open, broken into, or have their seals and locks tampered with. The difference is that communications, data and impersonation have created a second layer of risk alongside these physical attacks.
What should be the basic rule for every freight forwarder today?
Never skip a verification step, even when everyone is in a hurry. That pressure is precisely what criminals may try to exploit. A sudden address change, a new contact person, documents that will arrive later or insistence on an immediate decision should all prompt the team to pause and check everything again.
