Globalisation rested on three pillars: open markets, predictable rules and secure maritime routes. Now all three are threatened. The report notes the United States, creator of the order, now uses tariffs, leaves institutions and pursues aggressive economic tactics, while Russia, Iran and others use hybrid warfare from cyberattacks to proxy strikes. The result is the erosion of a vital global good: safe, dependable maritime trade.
Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have forced carriers to avoid Suez and reroute via the Cape of Good Hope. By mid-2024, Suez and Panama traffic fell by half, and tonnage through the Gulf of Aden dropped by three-quarters. Longer routes, higher insurance and reduced capacity drive up prices and cause delays, especially for import-reliant poorer states. Cape diversions turned perceived overcapacity into tight supply and volatile freight rates.
Trafigura estimates that Cape diversions cause tankers to burn an extra 200,000 barrels of fuel oil daily, raising annual tanker emissions by 4.5 percent. More miles mean more emissions and inflation, costs borne most by small economies with no say in the conflict.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, attacks, mines and blockades have struck merchant ships and ports, driving up war-risk premia and disrupting grain exports. Ships carry about 80 percent of global trade. Chokepoint disruptions now threaten food security, energy and growth for developing economies.
What links all this is the weaponisation of interdependence. Energy, food, and manufactured goods move largely by sea. When states or non-state actors disrupt shipping, they can impose economic costs far beyond the warzone while staying below the threshold of formal war. This is economic coercion in maritime disguise, politically tempting because leaders can signal toughness and hurt adversaries without substantial deployments.
The answer is not autarky. Reshoring everything would be hugely costly and, for smaller economies, impossible. A return to the old status quo is also unrealistic. Instead, maritime resilience must become an economic strategy and security policy. Countries should diversify routes and suppliers, invest in resilient ports, corridors and canals, and provide focused support to those most exposed to chokepoint risk.
Carriers and shippers must prepare for prolonged instability by building networks that can shift between corridors without breaking down.
Shipowners and operators must engage in this debate. Their choices about corridors, ports, flags, and data now shape which economies operate under stress. Governments must see that protecting maritime trade is not a business favour but a duty essential to open, rules-based globalisation which ensures supply for everyone. Critical in a world where there is hardly a country that can be fully self-sufficient.
Under Destruction is a warning, not a reason for fatalism. Weaponising interdependence is a political choice; so is rebuilding a maritime order with safe chokepoints, steady rules and a joint commitment to open sea lanes. Now is the time for leaders and institutions to act boldly to ensure shipping stays a bedrock public good of the world economy.
