Europe’s coercive connectivity cilemma: between rules and weaponised energy

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow progressively cut pipeline exports to the European Union, including halting supplies to individual member states and sharply reducing flows through Nord Stream and other routes. In response, EU institutions agreed a phased, legally binding ban on Russian gas imports, with LNG imports to be stopped from the end of 2026 and pipeline gas phased out by autumn 2027, explicitly to end dependency on Russian energy after what EU texts describe as the “weaponisation” of gas supplies. Prior to the invasion, Russian energy accounted for a very large share of EU imports, in some cases near or above 40–50 percent for gas, and the new framework allows European companies to invoke force majeure to exit contracts once the ban takes effect. In European law and policy, dependence on a single dominant supplier, once seen and framed as efficient, is now treated as a strategic vulnerability.

Red Sea disruption: Europe at the receiving end of chokepoints

Maritime disruptions have reinforced that lesson. Analyses of the Red Sea crisis report well over 150 Houthi attacks or incidents involving commercial shipping, prompting most major container lines on Asia-Europe routes to divert via the Cape of Good Hope. Estimates indicate that rerouting vessels away from the Suez Canal has increased global vessel and container ship demand by several percentage points, as longer voyages absorb effective capacity and extend transit times by 10–14 days on key Asia-Europe legs. Traffic data show sharp declines in Suez transits and in car-carrier use of the Red Sea, while European companies report production interruptions, parts shortages, and cost spikes. Taken together, this evidence shows that Europe’s position at the receiving end of several key corridors exposes it to decisions and conflicts far from its shores.

Indo-Pacific chokepoints and Europe’s distant dependence

Further east, the Indo-Pacific region has become central to Europe’s trade patterns. Studies on Europe’s Indo-Pacific exposure underline that the region now accounts for roughly one-third of EU external trade by value, while almost 90 percent of EU external goods trade overall moves by sea. Much of this commerce is channelled through a small number of chokepoints, including the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and the Taiwan Strait. The Strait of Malacca alone accounts for a substantial share of global trade and handles tens of thousands of ship transits per year, including large volumes of crude, LNG, and containerised goods moving between Asia and Europe. Data compiled from government and industry sources indicate that the Taiwan Strait sees well over 1,000 ship transits per week and carries a significant share of global container and electronics flows, and that Chinese live-fire exercises in 2022 and 2025 led to the temporary rerouting of civilian shipping and aviation around declared danger zones. These findings support the view that a large portion of Europe’s external trade depends on maritime chokepoints located far from EU territory.

De-risking without decoupling: Brussels’ policy response

EU strategy documents acknowledge this supply chain exposure. The 2021 EU Indo-Pacific strategy and subsequent analyses highlight that almost 90 percent of EU external goods trade is seaborne and that Indo-Pacific waterways are “vital” to EU economic interests, while warning that a major crisis in the South China Sea or around Taiwan would have “significant” repercussions for European trade and supply chains. Policy papers from European think tanks highlight an inconsistency between the scale of Europe’s maritime dependence in the Indo-Pacific and the limited tools available and at hand to shape security dynamics there, emphasising the need for more coherent engagement and a stronger maritime presence.

On the policy side, Brussels has developed the concept of “de-risking” rather than full decoupling. Which can be understood as less China. Speeches by European leaders call for systematic reductions in critical dependencies on “systemic rivals” such as China, backed by stress‑testing supply chains and encouraging diversification of inputs, routes, and technologies. European Council conclusions and follow-on reports translate this into proposals for increased intra-European production of critical technologies, more diversified sourcing of energy and raw materials from “reliable partners”, and investment in alternative trade corridors, such as overland rail links through Central Asia, enhanced Mediterranean and North African ports, and deeper ties with African, Latin American, and ASEAN economies. At the same time, research on sanctions and weaponised interdependence warns that Europe’s own use of broad sanctions and economic coercion can encourage targets and bystanders to develop shadow fleets, alternative finance channels, and non-Western partnerships, which, over time, may reduce the leverage of EU-centred hubs.

Europe’s choice: inward resilience or rule-anchored openness

In analytical terms, this leaves Europe with a dual challenge. On one hand, the EU’s internal market, its long-standing advocacy for the World Trade Organization, and its support for frameworks such as UNCLOS and IMO conventions reflect a commitment to a rules-based order in which law disciplines force. On the other hand, recent experience with weaponised gas, Red Sea attacks, and Indo-Pacific chokepoint risks shows that other actors are prepared to use pipelines, sea lanes, and air corridors as instruments of pressure, and that legal frameworks alone do not prevent that.

Policy documents and analysis suggest two broad directions. One is a more inward-looking Europe that leans harder on near-shoring and self-sufficiency to reduce exposure, with trade-offs in terms of growth, competitiveness, and influence documented in studies of decoupling and restricted-trade scenarios. The other is to reinforce a rule-anchored global system while making Europe’s logistics and energy networks more resilient: completing the agreed phase-out of Russian gas on schedule, investing in redundancy and contingency planning for critical maritime corridors such as Suez and Malacca, aligning corporate right-shoring plans with EU instruments such as anti-coercion tools and connectivity initiatives, and using the EU’s regulatory and market power to promote higher standards of maritime security, transparency and environmental performance along key routes. Existing EU texts already refer to several of these steps in energy‑security and connectivity strategies as part of broader efforts to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure and supply chains.

On this evidence, coercive connectivity in Europe’s case can be described as the intersection of weaponised energy, contested sea lanes, and a policy framework that still seeks to bind power through rules. The analytical question for European policymakers and businesses is how far they can move towards more diversified, resilient, and rules-based networks without undermining the openness that has underpinned European prosperity for decades.